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Public health expenditure in Spain: Is there partisan behaviour?  
 
Abstract 
This study examines the disparities in the evolution of Spanish regional public health 
expenditures from 1991 to 2010. We find that the recent development of the Spanish 
regional public health system have led the regions to reflect a very heterogeneous 
pattern of behaviour. These differences depend on economic and demographic factors, 
but also on the ideology of the regional governments. The longer a region is governed 
by a right-wing party, the lower the public health expenditure. This result suggests the 
presence of clear partisan behaviour in the Spanish public health system. 
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1. Introduction 
The debate on the importance and influence of public expenditure in a determined 
economy is almost as old as the history of Economics itself as a discipline. Keynes 
(1936) was one of the precursors of public intervention in the economy with the aim of 
fomenting aggregate demand in periods of recession. This idea, which remains fully 
valid in the current economic context, was already present in Malthus (1820), the first 
economist to realize the importance of strengthening demand through more generous 
models of public expenditure. As a fundamental part of public expenditure, health 
expenditure has not escaped from this discussion, becoming especially important in 
recent years due to, among other reasons, the economic crisis that has struck economies 
worldwide and the austerity policies that have tried to combat it. From an economic 
perspective, researchers have tried to work out the most efficient quantity of public 
expenditure, a major question, especially in times of crisis when public expenditure 
seems to be the cause of all economic evils and has motivated policies of cutbacks 
defended with special fervour by parties situated to the right of the political spectrum, 
an aspect that we will deal with during this study.    
A review of how the study of the evolution of health expenditure has been undertaken 
shows that many papers seek a relation between health expenditure and some 
macroeconomic and demographic variables, mainly using cross-sectional data. These 
works include Newhouse (1977), Leu (1986), Parkin et al .( 1987) and Brown (1987). 
This cross-sectional approach has the drawback of hiding the dynamic behaviour of the 
variables, an essential aspect if one wishes to obtain a performance measure for a 
certain situation, distinguishing between policies and short- and long-term performance. 
Given this interest, and benefitting from the development of better databases, we have 
recently witnessed a new upsurge in studies of health expenditure that, using panel data2 
or cointegration analysis3, allow the inclusion of the temporal dimension that is absent 
from cross-sectional studies. 
In spite of the notable progress propitiated by the inclusion of the dynamic component 
in these studies, it is no less true that previous works fail to take into account one key 
                                                            
2 See Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Gerdtham et al. (1998) and Barros (1998), amongst many others, in this 
regard. 
3 Culyer (1990) and Blomqvist and Carter (1997) are good examples of the use of these techniques. 
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aspect when trying to explain the evolution of public health expenditure, namely, 
geographic disaggregation. If we bear in mind that, in many economies, the decision-
making centres have been transferred from the central to the regional governments, it is 
easy to understand why using this type of regional data has been recently highlighted by 
Costa-Font and Pons-Novell (2007), amongst others. As a consequence, it comes as no 
surprise that some papers have recently emerged with the aim of studying the evolution 
of the health expenditure in countries with an important degree of territorial 
decentralization. In this regard, we can cite the papers of Di Matteo and Di Matteo 
(1998), Gianoni and Hitiris (2002), Mosca (2007) and Nguyen et al. (2009) for the cases 
of Canada, Italy, Switzerland and Finland, respectively. The conclusion that can be 
drawn from these papers is that the use of regional data may complement the analysis of 
the national ones, as well as minimizing the distortion caused by the aggregation of data 
on the elasticity of the GDP. A case of special interest that has, to our knowledge, not 
received much attention is that of Spain. We should note that the Spanish health system 
has undergone an important process of decentralization that has transferred the decision-
making power from the central government to each of the 17 regional governments in a 
relatively short time. We, thus, wonder whether, in this short time, the regional 
governments have maintained a similar policy with respect to health expenditure or 
whether, on the contrary, there are different visions of health expenditure across regions 
due to, among other factors, questions of an ideological nature. 
The latter point has recently been considered in some papers. For instance, Liang and 
Mirelman (2014) analyse the influence of political factors such as socio-political risk, 
government stability, corruption and ethnic tensions on public health expenditure, 
whilst Potrafke (2010) studies how government ideology and electoral results explain 
the growth of health expenditure in 18 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004. An even 
better example of the relationship between partisan policies and health expenditure 
growth is provided in Herwartz and Thelein (2014) who incorporate the ideological 
factor and the electoral cycles into the analysis of the determinants of public health 
expenditure for the OECD countries. These authors offer evidence of partisan 
behaviour, in the sense that right-wing governments spend less on health expenditure 
than left-wing governments. 
Against this background, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, as commented above, 
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we want to know whether the transfer of health competencies from the central 
government to the respective regional governments has produced changes in health 
policies or whether a common behaviour has been maintained in all of them. Second, 
assuming the existence of regional differences, we want to analyse whether some 
political and institutional factors, such as partisan behaviour, may help to explain them.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first introduces the Spanish 
process of regional decentralization in health care and, subsequently, describes the 
database used. Section 3 analyses the possible existence of common health policies by 
testing for convergence and carrying out a cluster analysis which allows us to prove the 
existence of different clubs of regions which share a similar evolution of public health 
expenditure. Section 4 is devoted to the explanation of these clubs and, particularity, to 
offering evidence about the presence of partisan behaviour in Spanish public health 
expenditure. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Public health expenditure in Spain 
Arguably, the main characteristic of the recent evolution of Spanish public health 
expenditure has been its decentralization. The Spanish process of regional 
decentralization was accompanied by the General Health Law of 1986 which 
consolidates a universal health care system. In 2001, a new finance plan was approved. 
This plan increased the fiscal responsibility of the regions and accelerated the process of 
decentralization in the management of the health system.  
This complex process implied a case-by-case negotiation between the central and 
regional governments and the use of very different finance systems for each region 
(Tamayo-Lorenzo, 2003), mainly due to the influence of historical and political 
motivations (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). Seven regions (Cataluña, Galicia, Islas 
Canarias, Comunidad Valencia, Andalucia, Navarra and País Vasco) gradually 
implemented their regional health policy after 1991 whilst, in the rest, the health 
competences were transferred in 2002. 
This institutional context has been taken into account in the analysis of the determinants 
of regional health expenditure in Spain and some empirical papers, such as Cantarero 
and Lago-Peñas (2012), analyse the influence of these three finance systems on health 
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expenditure by region. Furthermore, Lauridsen et al. (2008) analyse the behaviour of 
pharmaceutical expenditure for the Spanish provinces and Costa-Font and Moscone 
(2008) study, separately, pharmaceutical, inpatient care and primary care expenditures. 
The latter paper is of special relevance given that these authors find some of both 
neighbouring and political effects in total health expenditure decisions.  
These very important results have an important drawback because) they only consider a 
very short period which, additionally, finishes just after the completion of the transfer 
process and, consequently, cannot capture the consequences of the adoption of different 
regional health policies. Thus, it seems to be appropriate to use a more extended 
database, such as that recently provided by the BBVA Foundation and IVIE (2013), to 
capture the possible differences after the completion of the transfer process. This 
database contains statistical information on regional public health expenditure in Spain 
in 1991-2010. The total public health expenditure is also disaggregated into several 
components, the most important being hospital services, pharmaceutical, primary and 
capital expenditures. They represent, on average for the total sample, 55%, 21%, 15% 
and 4% of the total expenditure, respectively. We have transformed these data into real 
per capita values by using the corresponding regional GDP deflator. Appendix A 
includes the list of the 17 regions, with their respective acronyms that we will in this 
paper, and the average growth values. A quick glance at these results permits us to 
observe that the region of MAD shows the lowest growth rate ratios, except in the case 
of pharmaceutical expenditure, in which the lowest rate is shown by BAL. By contrast, 
MUR presents the highest growth rates for total and hospital services expenditure, BAL 
for primary and capital expenditures and GAL for pharmaceutical expenditures. We can 
also observe that pharmaceutical and, especially, capital expenditure exhibit a great 
heterogeneity, especially when comparing them with total expenditure or hospital 
services expenditure. 
In order to better interpret the evolution of the different public health expenditures, 
Figure 1 presents the coefficient of variation for the regional health expenditure 
components4. We can observe that most of these components reduce the value of this 
coefficient from the beginning of the sample up to 2001 but, after the end of the transfer 
                                                            
4 Capital expenditure exhibits very heterogeneous behavior and its inclusion in Figure 1 impedes the 
correct interpretation of the results. Consequently, we have opted to eliminate it. 
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process, the coefficient of variation grows. We can interpret this result as evidence 
against the existence of a convergence process. The exception is the case of hospital 
services, which reduces its coefficient of variation and, therefore, we should expect this 
component to show a higher degree of convergence.  
This initial analysis allows us to conclude that regional public health expenditure may 
show a high degree of heterogeneity, casting doubt on the existence of a common 
regional health policy. Instead, it seems to be appropriate to consider the possible 
existence of several clubs with different regional health policies, determined by political 
trends of the regional government. The next section is devoted to offering evidence in 
this regard by using convergence tests. 
3. Testing for convergence in Spanish public health expenditure  
The previous analysis has shown the disparities that exist between the behaviours of 
public health expenditure in the different regions of Spain. However, we should note 
that there seems to be a high level of correlation between these expenditures. To analyse 
this point, we have obtained some statistics in order to verify the possible existence of 
spatial correlation, as suggested by Costa-Font and Moscone (2008). In particular, we 
have taken into account the results of Pesaran (2004) who develops a new statistic for 
testing cross-sectional dependence. This statistic is defined as follows: 
N-1 N
ij
i=1 j=i+1
TCD = ρ
N(N-1)     (1) 
with  ijρ  being the pair-wise Pearson’s correlation coefficient of the residuals obtained 
from augmented Dickey-Fuller type regression equations. This statistic asymptotically 
converges towards a standard N(0,1) distribution under the null hypothesis of no cross-
sectional dependence. Alternatively, we can use the statistic proposed in Breusch and 
Pagan (1980), which can be defined as follows: 
( 1)/2
N-1 N
2 2
ij
i=1 j=i+1
LM=T ρ    N NAS  (2) 
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The results for the CD and the LM statistics are reported in Table 1. We can observe 
that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is easily rejected, which 
confirms our intuition about the high correlation in the health expenditures for the 17 
regions. 
[Insert Table 1] 
This initial result confirms the existence of spatial correlation for regional public health 
expenditure. However, if we take into account the huge differences between regions, we 
can easily conclude that the presence of spatial correlation is not enough to guarantee 
the existence of a unique pattern of behaviour. To this aim, we can test for the presence 
of a convergence process in Spanish public health expenditures. To do so, we have 
followed the recent papers of Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) (PS hereafter) in which they 
develop a very interesting framework to, first, test for the convergence hypothesis and, 
if this is rejected, to analyse the existence of clubs of regions that show similar patterns 
of behaviour.  
Following these authors, let us consider that Xit represents the variable of interest (in the 
present case, the per capita health expenditure either total or its functional components) 
with i=1, 2, …,  17 and t= 1991, …, 2010.  This variable can be decomposed as Xit = it 
t, where t is a common component and it is the idiosyncratic one. PS suggest testing 
for convergence by analysing whether it converges towards . To do so, they first 
define the relative transition component: 
1 1
1 1
h = it itit N N
it it
i i
X
N X N

 
 

 
 (3) 
In the presence of convergence, hit should converge towards unity, whilst its cross-
sectional variation (Hit) should go to 0 when T moves toward infinity,  
 21
1
H = 1 0,
N
it it
i
N h asT

    (4) 
PS test for convergence by estimating the following equation: 
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   1log 2log log log( ) , 1,...,t
t
H t t u t rT T
H
          (5) 
with r taking values in the (0.2, 0.3) interval, following the results of PS. Equation (5) is 
commonly known as the log-t regression. The null of convergence is tested by way of a 
standard t-statistic and, according to PS, the null hypothesis is rejected whenever this t-
statistic takes values lower than -1.65. If we reject convergence, we can use the PS 
algorithm to consider the existence of clubs5.   
The results that we have obtained are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows that the 
convergence null hypothesis is rejected for the total public health expenditure as well as 
for most of its functional components. The only exception is the hospital services 
expenditure. Furthermore, Table 3 confirms the presence of different clubs of regions 
that exhibit a similar pattern, a first step toward finding possible partisan health policies. 
Panel I of this table shows the original clubs obtained from the application of the PS 
algorithm. Given that this procedure tends to estimate more clubs than necessary, it is 
advisable to test for convergence between adjacent clubs. The final result leads us to the 
unification of some initial clubs for pharmaceutical and primary expenditures.  
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results) we have presented them on coloured maps 
in Figure 2.  
[Figure 2] 
The analysis of these figures leads us to some interesting insights. A simple look at the 
maps provides some evidence against the existence of a homogeneous pattern of 
behaviour for all the expenditures considered. In any event, we can test for the similarity 
of the estimated clubs by using the statistics of van der Waerden and Kruskal-Wallis. 
These statistics take the values 7.12 and 6.28, which leads us to reject that the 
                                                            
5 See Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) or Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2013) for a description of the use of 
this algorithm. 
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composition of the estimated clubs for the 3 components of public health expenditure 
are similar, when we use a standard 5% significance level. However, if we exclude the 
pharmaceutical expenditures and only consider the estimated clubs of primary 
expenditure and capital expenditure, we cannot reject the null hypothesis because these 
statistics take the values of 0.60 and 0.42, respectively, well below the critical value 
even for a liberal 10% significance level. Moreover, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of similarity of the distributions when we consider the clubs of primary and 
capital expenditures (0.61 and 043, respectively, for the van der Waarden and Kruskal-
Wallis statistics), whilst we obtain the opposite result when we analyse pharmaceutical 
versus primary (4.72 and 5.14) and versus capital expenditure (4.05 and 3.65). 
Therefore, it seems clear that the pattern of behaviour of pharmaceutical expenditure is 
rather different to that of the other components. 
We should also interpret the composition of the different clubs. To make this easier, the 
arithmetic means of these clubs have been obtained and included in Figure 3. If we 
begin with public health expenditure, Figure 8a, we can observe that all the indexes 
grow, including those of the divergent regions (AND, EXT and MAD). Moreover, the 
growth rate for the whole sample does not vary very much between the club indexes 
(3.1, 2.8, and 3.0, respectively, for clubs 1-3), whilst the divergent regions exhibit an 
average growth of 2.0, 3.7 and 1.3  for AND, EXT and MAD, respectively. However, 
the behaviour at the end of the sample is very different. The club indexes show a growth 
of 2.3, 2.8, and -1.4 for 2009-2010, whilst AND, EXT and MAD grow at -2.7, 0.4 and -
2.2, respectively. Thus, the behaviour is quite heterogeneous after the advent of the 
crisis because only AND, MAD and the regions included in club 3 diminished their per 
capita public health expenditure, whilst EXT maintains it and the rest have increased it 
at a rate similar to the pre-crisis one, especially the regions included in club 2 which 
showed a positive growth both in 2009 and in 2010.  
[Figure 3] 
The three functional components which do not exhibit convergence (pharmaceutical, 
primary and capital expenditure) show different patterns of behaviour. The 
pharmaceutical component grows at a rate over of 4% in 1991-2010. This growth rate is 
lower for primary expenditure, especially for MAD and the regions included in club 2 
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and even lower for capital expenditure, which is divided into two clubs that show a 
growth rate lower than 1.5%. However, the differences are even greater when 
considering 2009-2010. First, we can see that primary expenditure hardly varies for 
clubs 1, 2 and EXT during this period. By contrast, it clearly diminishes for MAD. 
Pharmaceutical expenditure increases for clubs 1 and 2, although at slow growth rates, 
whilst it decreases for club 3 (which includes MAD and other regions). Finally, capital 
expenditure shows a dramatic drop during the post-crisis period. 
4. Explanation of the clubs: Is there partisan behaviour? 
The previous section has shown that the public health expenditure of the Spanish 
regions exhibits different patterns of behaviour. Thus, it is of interest to investigate the 
sources of these differences. We should bear in mind that these differences can be 
explained by several factors, including geographical factors, socio-economic factors and 
partisan behaviours. In order to capture these effects, we have selected the following 
variables. 
- Geographical and spatial factors may be useful because the geomorphological 
characteristics of a region may condition its public health expenditure. For instance, if 
the population is disseminated over a large area, the regional government may need to 
increase expenditure to cover the whole population. By contrast, if the population is 
concentrated, the control and optimization of the expenditure is clearly easier and, 
consequently, this should imply a reduction in health expenditure. Thus, variables such 
as the extension of the each region (SURF), measured in km2 and the population density 
(DEN) may help us to explain the creation of the clubs. 
- Education: it is generally admitted that increases in the education level of a particular 
area can lead to increments in the health level of this area. This variable is proxied by 
the percentage of population with tertiary studies (SUP) and the percentage of illiterate 
population (ILLIT). 
- Climate Factors: health may be influenced by some climatic factors. We use the level 
of humidity (HUM) and the temperature in terms of days with a temperature above 25 
(TG25) and below zero degrees (TL0). 
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- Population structure: the structure of the population is also important in determining 
the volume of public health expenditure. A high proportion of dependent population 
may lead to an increase in expenditure. To cover this possibility, we use the percentage 
of population over 65 years old (G65) and under 15 years old (L15).  
- Economic characteristics: it has been appropriately documented that health 
expenditure can be explained by per capita GDP. It is possible, however, that the 
elasticity of the per capita GDP does not vary for the different regions and, 
consequently, this variable cannot help to explain the differences. To check this we use 
the average per capita GDP of each region (GDPpc).  
- Fiscal regime: in Spain, different fiscal regimes co-exist. NAV and PAV have a 
special status. To capture this effect, we have employed the dichotomous variable 
FISCAL, which takes the value 1 for NAV and PAV and 0 for the rest. 
- Partisan decisions: public health expenditure clearly depends on the decisions taken by 
the regional government. If the government favours the private sector over the public 
sector, it will probably enact policies to reduce public spending and, consequently, 
public health expenditure. The type of behaviour is defended by the Popular Party (PP), 
which has governed some Spanish regions since the arrival of the democracy in the late 
1970’s. To measure this partisan characteristic, we will use the average percentage of 
votes for the Popular Party, the percentage of years over the total sample that this party 
has governed a region (PPGOV) and the percentage of years over the total sample that a 
right-wing party has governed a region (RWGOV)6. Furthermore, we should note the 
existence of some regionalist or nationalist parties that play a very important role in the 
government of some regions. In order to take into account the influence of these 
regionalist/nationalist parties on public health expenditures, we have additionally 
created the variable NAT which reflects the percentage of votes for these parties. 
- Dummy variables: we have also considered some dummy variables for regions that 
consist of islands) (DISLAND) and for regions formed by a single province 
(DSINGLE). 
                                                            
6We have chosen to consider as right-wing parties the Popular Party and the following 
nationalist/regionalist parties: the PAR (Aragonese Party), the Canary Coalition, the PNV (Basque 
nationalist party) and Convergence and Union (Catalan nationalist party).  
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Prior to the use of these variables to estimate an appropriate model, we consider it 
useful to carry out a simple descriptive analysis of these data. Table 4 summarizes the 
average values of these variables for all the regions included in each club, taking as 
reference the case of the total public health expenditure.  
[Table 4] 
The average values of the different explanatory variables show that the regions assigned 
to club 1 have mainly been governed by a left-wing party, exhibit a low population 
density, maintain a degree of dependent population above the national average and have 
a per capita value higher than the Spanish average. By contrast, the regions included in 
club 3 have mostly been governed by right-wing parties, show a high population 
density, a population over 65 which is lower than the national average and a high level 
of education.  
Having determined and described the data set, we should analyse the interaction 
between the explanatory variables and club membership. To that end, an ordered probit 
model has been used to predict how regional characteristics affect the likelihood that 
any given region would be found to be a member of each convergence club. To explain 
the structure of the model, we should note that the values of the variable yi depend on 
the number of estimated clubs. In general, we have that: 
yi= m for m=1,...,M (6) 
with M being the number of clubs estimated by the PS methodology. These assigned 
values are assumed to be derived from some unobservable latent variable yi* where: 
yi*= xi’ + ui,  i=1,2,…,17 (7)  
where β is a k×1 parameter vector and ui reflects the stochastic disturbance term.  
We could interpret that the different m values imply an ordination of the clubs and, 
therefore, the observed variable yi can be related to the latent variable by way of the 
following equation: 
yi =m, if αm-1≤ yi*≤αm  (8) 
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for a set of parameters α0 to αM , where αo<α1<α2...<αM, with αo=-∞ and αM=∞.  
The conditional probability of observing the m-th category can be written as: 
Pr(yi=m/xi)=Pr(αm-1≤ yi*≤αm) = Pr(α m-1≤ xi’ + ui ≤αm) = 
= Pr(ui≤αm- xi’) - Pr(ui ≤ αm-1 - xi’) for m=1,.., 4. (9) 
To evaluate the conditional probability, a distributional assumption for the disturbance 
term ui is required. In the present case, we assume a normal distribution, yielding the 
ordered probit model7. Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of this model for 
total health expenditure, as well as for the functional components that reject the 
convergence null hypothesis. For all these models, the final specification has been 
selected by following a general-to-particular strategy, where the non-significant 
variables have been iteratively removed. Finally, we should note that the quality of the 
estimations is limited by the shortness of the sample because we have only 17 possible 
observations. The sample availability is even shorter for total public health expenditure 
and for its primary component if we exclude the divergent regions. In order to mitigate 
this problem, it seems advisable to assign the divergent regions to some of the estimated 
clubs. The cases of EXT and MAD are not very complicated, given that it seems to be 
appropriate to include them in the first and last club, respectively. The case of AND is 
more problematic. However, as this region is included in club 1 for primary and capital 
expenditure and its relative transition path is more correlated with that of club 1 than 
with those of clubs 2 or 3, we have decided to include AND in club 1 for total public 
health expenditure8.  
[Table 5] 
The estimated model for health expenditure includes the following variables: the per 
capita GDP (GDPpc), the population density of the region (DEN), a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the region is made up of islands (DISLAND) and, the most 
important for our purposes, the percentage of years that the region has been governed by 
a right-wing party (RGOV).  
                                                            
7 The ordered logit model leads us to similar results, although with a slightly lower explanatory power. 
8 We should note that the results remain almost unaltered when AND is excluded from the sample for total public health per capita 
expenditure. 
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The interpretation of the model is quite easy. The evolution of public health expenditure 
is directly related to the growth of the economy and the higher the GDPpc, the more 
likely it is that the region will be assigned to clubs with higher per capita health 
expenditure. By contrast, the higher the population density, the more likely it is that the 
region will be assigned to clubs with low public health expenditure. The two island 
regions, BAL and CAN, show a lower value of public health expenditure and, therefore, 
are included in clubs 2 and 3.  
But, in our view, the most important result is that of the relevance of the variable 
RWGOV in explaining the behaviour of the different clubs. This variable measures the 
number of years that a right-wing party has governed a region and, consequently, the 
influence of its policies on public health expenditure. As we can easily see, the longer a 
region has been governed by a right-wing party, the lower the public health expenditure 
and, therefore, the higher the probability of being in clubs 2 and 3. Thus, we should 
conclude that there is a clear and significant partisan behaviour in the evolution of 
Spanish public health expenditure. 
To better appreciate the magnitude of the estimated effects, we have carried out a 
sensibility analysis by drawing the predicted probability of being in each club for an 
“average region”9, allowing each explanatory variable to vary in turn. The graphical 
results of these simulations are shown in Figure 4. We can see (Figure 4a) that regions 
where a right-wing party has not governed have a high probability of being included in 
club 1, which implies comparatively lower public health expenditure. The longer that a 
region has been governed by a right-wing party, the lower the probability of belonging 
to club 1. 
We can appreciate more variations when the demographic variable (DEN) is considered. 
For instance, Figure 4b shows that a population density lower than 200 inhabitants per 
km2 implies a probability greater than 50% of this region being included in club 1. The 
fact that 9 regions have a population density lower than this value leads us to understand 
the importance of this variable in determining the adscription of a particular region to a 
                                                            
9 Assuming that the variable DISLAND takes the value 0, the estimated probability of this average region being in club 1 is 60% 
and 37% for club 2. If DISLAND takes the value 1, these probabilities change to 27% and 65%, respectively 
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club. Finally, as we can observe in Figure 4c, the higher the per capita GDP, the greater 
the probability of being assigned to club 1. 
[Figure 4] 
The results for the disaggregated components are quite heterogeneous, as expected. We 
can observe that the economic dimension of the region is not statistically important to 
explain the cluster results. By contrast, the demographic variable (DEN) maintains its 
importance and appears in all the estimated models, although its effects seem to be 
lower for capital and pharmaceutical than for primary expenditures. If the region 
consists of islands, the pharmaceutical expenditure, but not the other functional 
components, is negatively affected. We should also note that we use two additional 
explanatory variables. The primary and pharmaceutical expenditure models include a 
variable that reflects the administrative composition of the region. The variable 
SINGLE takes the value 1 if the region is made up of a single province and 0 otherwise. 
Its effect is different in the two models, implying a comparatively lower per capita 
pharmaceutical expenditure but a greater per capita primary expenditure. Finally, the 
age structure helps us to explain the evolution of capital expenditure and the higher the 
percentage of population under 15 (L15), the higher the expenditures.  
We have left until last the analysis of the presence of partisan behaviour in the 
functional components. The results in Table 6 corroborate its existence in Spanish 
regional public health expenditure. It is true that the estimated model for pharmaceutical 
expenditure does not include any partisan variable, but this is understandable if we bear 
in mind that there is some lack of decentralization in the decisions related to this 
expenditure. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the variable RWGOV is statistically 
significant for explaining the results of the regional clusters of primary service 
expenditure. The estimated effect is similar to that observed in total public health 
expenditure and the longer a region has been governed by a right-wing party, the greater 
the probability of being included in the group of the smallest spenders. We can also 
offer some evidence of partisan behaviour for capital expenditure given that we observe 
the existence of some effects associated with nationalist/regionalist parties. However, 
the meaning of this partisan effect is the opposite of that previously seen because the 
regions with a higher regionalist vote are more likely to be included in the clubs that 
17 
 
exhibit a higher level of expenditure. This result can be understood if we bear in mind 
the way these nationalist/regionalist parties act: they tend to be deeply-rooted in certain 
areas, leading them to favour these areas to the detriment of the rest of the region and 
indicating some level of patronage. However, given the lower precision of the results 
for this level of disaggregation and the difficulty of defining what is and what is not 
capital expenditure, we believe that this result should be interpreted with some caution 
until new data help us corroborate this finding. 
5. Conclusions. 
This paper has analysed the evolution of regional public health expenditure in Spain. 
The sample data covers the period 1991-2010. During these years, the Spanish health 
system underwent a very important centrifugal movement that transferred the decision-
making centres for health from the central government to regional governments. We 
first studied whether there is a single public health expenditure policy or whether, on the 
contrary, different patterns of behaviour exist. To do this, we used the PS convergence 
test, which does not support the convergence hypothesis. This statistic led us to 
conclude that there are important disparities in the regional evolution of the per capita 
public health expenditure in spite of the short time elapsed since the beginning of the 
process of transferring health competencies from the central government to the regions. 
The PS methodology allows us to group the Spanish regions. Again, we observe a 
heterogeneous behaviour, especially in the evolution of health expenditure after the 
crisis. With respect to the three functional components, pharmaceutical, primary and 
capital expenditure, which showed different patterns of behaviour during the pre-crisis 
period, our results lead us to conclude that these differences are even greater in 2009-
2010.  
The presence of clubs in regional public health expenditure invites us to examine the 
determinants of this grouping. According to our results, the inclusion of a region in a 
particular club mainly depends on its population density, its per capita GDP and, very 
importantly, the percentage of years that this region has been governed by a right-wing 
party (RWGOV). This result comes to corroborate previous findings in the literature, 
such as those of Costa-Font and Moscone (2008) or Herwartz and Theilen (2014), and 
reinforces the idea that institutional factors play a decisive role in the determination of 
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the regional health expenditure. In particular, our results prove that regions with right-
wing governments tends to show lower public health expenditure than similar regions 
governed with a different ideology, confirming the existence of partisan behaviour in 
Spanish public health expenditure.  
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Table 1. Testing for spatial dependence. 
 CD LM 
Total Public Health expenditure 9.67* 437.31* 
Hospital Services Expenditure 6.84* 327.81* 
Pharmaceutical Expenditure 16.54* 587.57* 
Primary Expenditure 15.57*   435.24* 
Capital Expenditure 4.51* 222.48* 
This table reflects the values of the statistics for testing the non cross-sectional dependence null 
hypothesis. CD represents the statistics defined in Pesaran (2004) whilst LM is the statistic 
defined in Breusch and Pagan (1980). 
*  means the rejection of the null hypothesis for a restrictive 1% significance level. 
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Table 2. Testing for convergence. 
Variable   t-stat 
Total Public Health Expenditure ‐1.29  ‐13.55* 
Hospital Services Expenditure ‐0.28  ‐1.39 
Pharmaceutical Expenditure ‐1.40  ‐13.63* 
Primary Expenditure ‐1.02  ‐6.88* 
Capital Expenditure ‐0.79  ‐2.81* 
The table reports the statistics proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to test for convergence. The 
term log t stands for a parameter which is twice the speed of convergence of this club towards 
the average. t-stat is the convergence test statistic, which is distributed as a simple one-sided t-
test with a critical value of −1.65 (see Phillips and Sul, 2007 for further details). 
*  means the rejection of the convergence null hypothesis. 
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Table 3. Estimated Clubs. 
Panel A. Total Public Health Expenditure 
I. Original Clubs II. Testing for adjacent clubs. 
Regions t-stat Clubs t-stat 
Club 1: ARA, AST, CLM, MUR, NAV, PAV, 
LAR 
0.69 1+2 -3.17 
Club 2: BAL  CAB      CYL      CAT     CVA -1.50 2+3 -1.76 
Club 3: CAN      GAL 1.62   
No convergence: AND, EXT, MAD    
Panel B. Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
I. Original Clubs II. Testing for adjacent clubs. 
Regions t-stat Clubs t-stat 
Club 1: ARA      AST      CVA      EXT      
GAL 
0.87 1+2 -0.91 
Club 2: CYL      CLM      MUR      PAV 2.39 1+2+3 -
11.64
Club 3:  AND     CAN      CAB      CAT      
NAV      LAR 
1.48 3+4 -5.47 
Club 4:  BAL, MAD 2.28   
Panel D. Primary Expenditure 
I. Original Clubs II. Testing for adjacent clubs. 
Regions t-stat Clubs t-stat 
Club 1: AND, ARA, BAL, CAB, CYL, CLM, 
CAT, NAV, PAV, LAR 
-0.71 1+2 -1.04 
Club 2: AST      MUR -1.52 1+2+3 -5.64 
Club 3: CAN      CVA      GAL 1.32   
No convergence: EXT, MAD    
Panel E. Capital Expenditure 
I. Original Clubs II. Testing for adjacent clubs. 
Regions t-stat Clubs t-stat 
Club 1: AND, ARA, BAL, CAN, CAB, CYL, 
CLM, CAT, CVA, EXT, GAL, MUR, NAV, 
PAV 
1.21 1+2 -2.81 
Club 2: AST, MAD, LAR -1.23   
The clubs reported have been obtained by applying the algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) which aims to find groups of 
regions with similar convergence speeds to the average. t-stat is the convergence test statistic, which is distributed as a simple one-
sided t-test with a critical value of −1.65 (see Phillips and Sul, 2007 for further details). 
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Table 4. Average values of the different variables. 
 Variable Definition club1 club2 club 3 Total Spain 
PPGOV 
Percentage of years in which the 
region has had a PP president 0.31 0.56 0.52 0.42 
RWGOV 
Percentage of years in which the 
region has had a right-wing party 
president. 0.42 0.69 0.82 0.57 
NATIO 
Percentage of votes for nationalist / 
regionalist parties in elections. 
Average 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
DENSITY Regional population density. Average 93.02 165.16 395.71 167.64 
SURFACE Regional surface area (in km2) 33,445 31,981 15,017 29,762 
PC GDP 
GVA at constant 2000 prices divided 
by the population. Period average. 18,764 17,786 18,906 18,501 
L15 
Percentage of population under 15 
years old. Period average. 15.34 14.83 15.39 15.20 
G65 
Percentage of population over 65 
years old. Period average. 17.42 17.11 15.21 16.94 
RAIN Average rainfall. 595.96 606.02 680.34 613.81 
HUM Average degree of humidity. 61.79 63.22 60.14 61.92 
TG25 
Average number of days with 
temperatures below 0. 111.90 106.89 101.16 108.53 
TL0 
Average number of days with 
temperature above 0. 25.60 19.56 15.54 22.05 
ILLITERACY 
Percentage of population without 
studies. Average 2.70 1.61 2.31 2.31 
SUP 
STUDIES 
Percentage of population with higher 
education and doctoral degrees. 
Average 21.59 20.65 22.89 21.54 
This table presents the average values of the variables that have been used in the ordered probit 
estimation. Clubs 1-3 correspond to the results of the application of the cluster algorithm to the per capita 
total public health expenditure. 
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Table 5. Ordered probit estimates of health expenditure convergence club. 
 Total Pharmaceutica
l 
Primary Capital 
GDP pc -0.0002 
(-3.50) 
   
RWGOV 1.82 
(2.08) 
 1.88 
(1.66) 
 
DEN 0.008 
(4.18) 
0.004 
(3.15) 
0.005 
(2.65) 
0.004 
(2.29) 
DISLAND 1.66 
(2.81) 
2.27 
(3.71) 
  
DSINGLE  1.50 
(2.01) 
-1.61 
(-2.17) 
 
L15    -0.64 
(-3.16) 
NATIO    -9.00 
(-2.51) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.63 
Percentage of 
cases correctly 
predicted 
70.6% 77% 82.4% 88.2% 
This table includes the results of the estimation of ordered probit models for the total 
public health expenditure (per capita) and its components. The dependent variable is the 
ordinal value of the different clubs in which the health expenditures are clustered. In order 
to mitigate the lack of freedom degrees, we have included the divergent regions (AND 
and EXT) in club 1, whilst MAD has been joined to the regions of club 3.  
The values in parentheses represent the robust estimations of the standard deviations of 
the estimators. 
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Appendix A. 
 
Table A1. List of regions and growth rates of the public health expenditures 
Number Region Acronym Total 
Expenditure 
Hospital 
Services 
Pharmaceutical 
Expenditure 
Primary 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
1 Andalucía AND 1.91 1.69 2.65 1.88 17.8 
2 Aragón ARA 2.90 2.93 3.43 1.45 22.1 
3 Asturias  AST 3.03 3.27 4.37 2.28 7.1 
4 I. Baleares  BAL 3.15 3.88 2.37 3.39 48.2 
5 Canarias CAN 2.31 2.82 7.20 1.20 9.7 
6 Cantabria CAB 2.89 2.55 4.58 2.13 31.8 
7 Castilla y 
León 
 
CYL 2.81 3.11 4.12 1.46 27.1 
8 Castilla-La 
Mancha 
 
CLM 3.41 4.27 3.29 2.06 22.0 
9 Cataluña CAT 2.58 3.36 2.97 1.54 21.4 
10 C.Valenciana CVA 2.24 3.03 2.97 1.21 16.8 
11 Extremadura EXT 3.60 3.75 4.49 2.56 25.5 
12 Galicia GAL 3.52 3.39 9.15 2.29 16.9 
13 Madrid MAD 0.98 0.95 3.38 0.11 7.0 
14 Murcia MUR 4.04 4.62 4.90 2.51 14.9 
15 Navarra NAV 2.03 2.61 2.86 0.99 41.4 
16 País Vasco PAV 2.61 2.85 4.36 1.75 26.1 
17 La Rioja LAR 3.64 4.45 4.86 2.91 6.3 
 Average 
values 
  
2.80 3.12 
 
4.10 1.87 21.3 
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Figure 1: -convergence: Evolution of the coefficient of variation. 
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Figure 2. Estimated clusters for Total Public Health Expenditure and its functional 
components. 
A. Total public health expenditure B. Pharmaceutical expenditure 
  
C. Primary Expenditure D. Capital Expenditure 
  
Regions of Cluster 1: white 
Regions of Cluster 2: light grey. 
Regions of Cluster 3: dark grey. 
Divergent regions: black dotted. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The regions are numbered in Table A1. 
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Figure 3. Average value of the different clubs and divergent regions 
a) Total Public Health Expenditures b) Pharmaceutical Expenditures 
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c) Primary Expenditures d) Capital Expenditures 
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This figure represents the average value of the health expenditure of the regions 
included in the different clubs, jointly with the health expenditure of the divergent 
regions 
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Figure 4. Sensibility analysis. Total Public Health Expenditure 
Figure 4a. Variation of the probabilities due to change in the number of years that a 
region is governed by a right-wing party.  
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Figure 4b. Variation of the probabilities due to change in the density of the region. 
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Figure 4c. Variation of the probabilities due to change in the per capita GDP. 
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Note: This table exhibits the estimated probability of a non-insular region being 
included in clubs 1-3 when one of the explanatory variables varies and the rest of the 
explanatory variables take the sample average values.  
 
